Duality of Power and State Erosion: An Analysis of the Repercussions of Executive Division in Libya (2021–2026)
Keywords:
Executive Division, Libya, State Erosion, Political Legitimacy, Duality of Power, Fragile State, Political Conflict, Political Economy of ConflictAbstract
This study examines the phenomenon of executive division in Libya during the period (2021–2026) as one of the most significant challenges facing state-building efforts in the transitional phase. This phenomenon emerged in the context of the stalled electoral process and the absence of a consensual constitutional framework, leading to the emergence of two parallel executive authorities, each deriving legitimacy from different sources. This, in turn, has reproduced the crisis of legitimacy in a more complex form. The study is based on a central assumption that executive division does not merely represent a temporary political condition, but rather reflects a structural pattern of state reconfiguration within a conflict context, where political, institutional, and economic factors intersect, reshaping state functions and priorities. The study adopts an explanatory analytical approach supported by a case study methodology, within a theoretical framework that integrates the concepts of fragile state, dual authority, political legitimacy, and the political economy of conflict. The findings indicate that executive division has contributed to the emergence of multiple and competing sources of legitimacy, where no single actor is capable of monopolizing political legitimacy. This has affected the stability of the political system and resulted in persistent institutional fluidity. At the institutional level, the division has led to what can be described as “administrative fragmentation,” with institutions operating under divergent frameworks, thereby limiting their capacity to implement unified public policies. At the financial level, the analysis reveals clear impacts of the division on the management of public resources, particularly within Libya’s rentier economic structure. The absence of financial coordination has complicated the process of preparing and implementing a unified state budget, while enabling heterogeneous spending patterns that, in some cases, are used as tools for redistributing resources within the framework of political competition. This situation is also linked to security challenges, due to overlapping decision-making centers and the multiplicity of actors, which affects the state’s ability to exercise coherent institutional control. At the societal level, the study highlights what may be termed the “Libyan paradox,” whereby the abundance of natural resources does not translate into tangible improvements in living conditions. This is largely attributed to weak institutional coordination and distorted spending priorities. Consequently, this has led to declining levels of trust in public institutions and the emergence of alternative coping mechanisms, such as reliance on local networks and the informal economy. The study concludes that executive division in Libya has contributed to the consolidation of a form of hybrid governance that combines formal institutional structures with informal arrangements shaped by evolving political and security dynamics. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates that the relationship between executive division and state erosion is not linear but interactive, with each reinforcing the other in a continuous cycle of crisis reproduction. Overall, the study emphasizes that addressing executive division in Libya requires a comprehensive approach that goes beyond short-term political solutions toward rebuilding the foundations of governance, strengthening institutional cohesion, ensuring that available resources are translated into sustainable development outcomes, and restoring trust between the state and society.

